Dr. Haim Zlatokrilov

Network research and cyber security


Poster and brief announcement
Anat Bremler-Barr, Michael Czeizler

Auto-scaling is a fundamental capability of cloud computing which allows consuming resources dynamically according to changing traffic needed to be served.
By the micro-services architecture paradigm, software systems are built as a set of loosely-coupled applications and services that can be individually scaled.
In this paper, we present a new attack the \emph{Tandem Attack} that exploits the Tandem behavior of micro-services with different scaling properties. Such issues can result in Denial of Service (DoS) and Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) created by malicious attackers or self-inflicted due to wrong configurations set up by administrators. We demonstrate the Tandem attack using a popular AWS serverless infrastructure modeling two services and show that removing servers’ management responsibility from the cloud users does not mitigate the different scaling properties challenge and can even make the problem harder to solve.

Conferences & Workshops
Yehuda Afek, Anat Bremler-Barr, Dor Israeli and Alon Noy
The International Symposium on Cyber Security, Cryptology and Machine Learning (CSCML),

This paper presents a new localhost browser based vulnerability and corresponding attack that opens the door to new attacks on private networks and local devices. We show that this new vulnerability may put hundreds of millions of internet users and their IoT devices at risk. Following the attack presentation, we suggest three new protection mechanisms to mitigate this vulnerability.
This new attack bypasses recently suggested protection mechanisms designed to stop browser-based attacks on private devices and local applications.

Conferences & Workshops
Yehuda Afek, Anat Bremler-Barr, Shani Stajnrod
Usenix Security ,

Malicious actors carrying out distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are interested in requests that consume a large amount of resources and provide them with ammunition. We present a severe complexity attack on DNS resolvers, where a single malicious query to a DNS resolver can significantly increase its CPU load. Even a few such concurrent queries can result in resource exhaustion and lead to a denial of its service to legitimate clients. This attack is unlike most recent DDoS attacks on DNS servers, which use communication amplification attacks where a single query generates a large number of message exchanges between DNS servers.

The attack described here involves a malicious client whose request to a target resolver is sent to a collaborating malicious authoritative server; this server, in turn, generates a carefully crafted referral response back to the (victim) resolver. The chain reaction of requests continues, leading to the delegation of queries. These ultimately direct the resolver to a server that does not respond to DNS queries. The exchange generates a long sequence of cache and memory accesses that dramatically increase the CPU load on the target resolver. Hence the name non-responsive delegation attack, or NRDelegationAttack.

We demonstrate that three major resolver implementations, BIND9, Unbound, and Knot, are affected by the NRDelegationAttack, and carry out a detailed analysis of the amplification factor on a BIND9 based resolver. As a result of this work, three common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) regarding NRDelegationAttack were issued by these resolver implementations. We also carried out minimal testing on 16 open resolvers, confirming that the attack affects them as well.

Technical reports
Yehuda Afek, Anat Bremler-Barr, Niv Focus,

The objective of this study is to propose an efficient solution for Low-Rate Attacks (LRA), such as scraping attacks that aim to download all the Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) of a website. Attackers attempt to evade detection by behaving like regular users while browsing a small set of distinct pages (URI) at small time scales. However, at larger time scales, the attacker becomes a distinct heavy hitter that requests numerous distinct URIs. Although there are several space-efficient and time-efficient methods to detect distinct heavy hitters, they still require excessive memory to track all users over a large time scale. In this research, an innovative streaming algorithm is proposed to detect the attacker.

Poster and brief announcement
Anat Bremler-Barr, Tal Shapira, Daniel Alfasi

With the continuous increase in reported Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs), security teams are overwhelmed by vast amounts of data, which are often analyzed manually, leading to a slow and inefficient process. To address cybersecurity threats effectively, it is essential to establish connections across multiple security entity databases, including CVEs, Common Weakness Enumeration (CWEs), and Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPECs). In this study, we introduce a new approach that leverages the RotatE \cite{RotatE} knowledge graph embedding model, initialized with embeddings from Ada language model developed by OpenAI \cite{embeddingada}. Additionally, we extend this approach by initializing the embeddings for the relations. \ignore{This method surpasses previous attempts and provides a valuable tool for security teams to efficiently identify and respond to cybersecurity threats.
Unlike previous works that only handled CVEs present in the training set, our approach can deal with unseen entities. Furthermore, we contribute a comprehensive dataset and our models for future benchmarking.